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 Discursive Psychology:  
Mind and Reality in Practice 
 
This chapter will introduce the perspective of discursive psychology.  It will 
introduce its basic theoretical and methodological features, and then flesh them out 
using a series of recent studies of a child protection helpline.  Discursive psychology 
will be used to make sense of a range of features of what happens on the helpline.  In 
turn, the analysis of the helpline will be used to illuminate the nature of discursive 
psychology (henceforth DP). 
DP is a perspective that starts with the psychological phenomena as things 
that are constructed, attended to, and understood in interaction.  Its focus is on the 
ways descriptions can implicate psychological matters, on the ways psychological 
states are displayed in talk, and on the way people are responded to as upset, 
devious, knowledgeable or whatever.  It thus starts with a view of psychology that is 
fundamentally social, relational and interactional.  It is not just psychology as it 
appears in interaction; rather, it understands much of our psychological language, 
and broader ‘mental practices’, as organized for action and interaction.  It is a 
specifically discursive psychology because discourse – talk and texts – is the primary 
medium for social action.    
Most research in modern cognitive and social psychology takes as its central 
topic mental entities, representations or broad processing systems.  Entities such as 
scripts, schemata, attitudes, attention, theory of mind, perception, memory, and 
attribution heuristics figure large in such research.  DP is not a direct counter to such 
research (although, as we will show, it raises a range of questions with how such 
things are theorized and operationalized).  Its aim is rather different.  Rather than 
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trying to get inside people’s heads to get at these entities the focus is on discourse: 
talk and texts in social practices.  It looks for psychology in a completely different 
place.   
Take the central and traditional social psychological notion of attitudes for 
example, rather than considering attitudes as mental entities that drive behaviour (as 
they are conceptualized in social cognition, such as in Ajzen’s (1991) well known 
theory of planned behaviour) in DP they are respecified in terms of a broader 
concern with the construction of evaluations and what evaluations are used to do.  
For instance, in DP work has studied the way food evaluations figure as part of the 
activity of complimenting the cook, as inducements to an adolescent girl to eat, or as 
the building blocks of a complaint about child abuse (Wiggins & Hepburn, in press; 
Wiggins & Potter, 2003).  Conversely, DP work has studied how the absence of 
evaluation, and specifically the absence of an individual’s attitude, is constructed, 
such as when making negative comments about minority groups (Potter & Wetherell, 
1988; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).  So in environments where issues of prejudice and 
discrimination are live it can be important to not have a (negative) attitude, but 
merely to be objectively describing the world (including any putative negative 
characteristics of minority groups).  Indeed, in DP the whole distinction between 
what is subjective (psychological) and objective (real, in the world) is seen as 
something that is constructed, attended to and reworked in discourse (Edwards, in 
press; Potter, 1996).   
Put briefly, DP treats discourse as having three key characteristics.  First, it is 
action-oriented.  Discourse is recognised to be primarily a practical medium and the 
primary medium for action.  Second it is situated.  It is organized sequentially, such 
that the primary environment for what is said is, typically, what was said just 
previously, and what is said sets up, but does not determine, what will be said 
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immediately following it.  It is situated institutionally in the sense that it is embedded 
in, and often constitutive of, practices such as news interviews, relationship conflicts 
or air traffic control instructions.  It is situated rhetorically in the sense that 
constructions may be oriented to counter relevant alternatives.  Third it is both 
constructed and constructive.  It is constructed in the sense that discourse is put 
together from different elements such as words, categories, commonplaces, 
interpretative repertoires and other elements.  It is constructive in the sense that 
versions of the world, of actions and events, of mental life and furniture are put 
together and stabilized in talk.    
Methodologically, discursive psychology uses careful and systemic analysis of 
discourse to reveal phenomena of this kind.  DP is a package – its topic, discourse, 
requires an analytic approach that can do justice to the nature of discourse.  
Discourse works neither in the manner of a mechanical system of weights and 
pulleys, nor in the manner of a linguistic grammar book with formal rules.  The 
traditional psychological tools of experiment and survey are not tuned for this job.   
In this chapter we will not say much about methodological issues, although they may 
become apparent as we described the development of research - for more elaborate 
coverage of methodological issues in DP see Potter (2003a,b, 2004) and Wood and 
Kroger (2000).  But first some context and history. 
A Brief History of Discursive Psychology  
Discursive psychology emerged out of the specific strand of discourse analysis 
that developed in social psychology in the 1980s.  This in turn had its somewhat 
convoluted roots in the sociology of scientific knowledge, post-structuralism, 
linguistic philosophy, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.  Let us briefly 
sketch the outlines of this early work, starting with Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
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which is probably the work that did most to establish the power and nature of a 
discourse approach to psychological issues.   
This book laid out a discourse analytic approach to the psychological topics 
familiar from traditional social psychology textbooks, such as attitudes, accounts, the 
self, categories and representations.  In each case the focus was on the way these 
entities figured in interaction.  For example, it drew on Harvey Sacks’ (1992) work on 
membership categories to offer a critique of the standard treatment of categories as 
mental entities that organize (and distort) perception and it offers one of the first 
attempts to apply conversation analysis to a social psychological topic in its critical 
consideration of the literature on accounts.  
One of the central analytic notions of Potter & Wetherell (1987) was that of 
interpretative repertoires, that is interrelated sets of terms, used with some stylistic 
coherence, and often organized around particular tropes or metaphors.  This notion 
comes from Gilbert & Mulkay’s (1984) study of the different repertoires that 
scientists use to construct their social world when they are arguing with one another.  
It was developed in Wetherell & Potter (1992) which studied the way Päkehä New 
Zealanders constructed versions of social conflict and social organizations to 
legitimate particular versions of relations between groups.  Much of the interest was 
in ideological questions of how the organization of accounts, and the resources used 
in those accounts, could be used to help understand the reproduction of broad 
patterns of inequality and privilige.   
This work also drew on Billig’s (1987[1996]) rhetorical psychological notions, 
including the idea of a rhetorical commonplace.  Billig suggests that for any culture at 
any time in history there will be certain phrases or sayings that have a familiar or 
taken-for-granted quality.  Wetherell & Potter (1992) show how Päkehä New 
Zealanders draw on a contradictory weave of commonplaces to construct arguments 
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against social change and critique.  Billig (1992) also used the notions of rhetorical 
commonplaces and interpretative repertoires in his study of the way ordinary British 
people talk about the Royal Family.  He showed the way these linguistic resources 
were fundamental for reproducing certain assumptions about nationality, privilege, 
equality and change.  He suggested that participants are performing ‘acts of 
settlement’ in their talk, settling ‘ordinary people down into their place within the 
imagined national community’ (Billig, 1992: 22).  For an overview of these major 
early studies see Hepburn (2003, ch. 7).   
While these studies are commonly described as discourse analysis Edwards & 
Potter (1992) laid out the basics of a more distinctive discursive psychology.  Part of 
the reason for this naming was simply to provide a more clear-cut differentiation 
from the confusing range of approaches dubbed discourse analysis from across the 
social sciences (see Jaworski & Coupland, 1999; Wetherell, et al., 2001).   Discursive 
Psychology was distinctive in applying ideas from discourse analysis specifically to 
psychological issues.  It took as its topic memory and attribution and offered a 
respecification of both topics in terms of discourse practices – rather than 
considering them as mental entities and processes it treated remembering in terms 
of situated descriptions and attribution in terms of the way descriptions are 
organized to manage speaker accountability and to assign blame.  A central feature of 
the work involved taking research in memory and attribution which either used 
natural interaction or addressed linguistic issues, and showing how its conclusions 
were distorted by its failure to address the practical nature of language use.   
This strand of work was developed more fully in two subsequent works.  
Potter (1996) offered a systematic rethink of constructionism.  This was organized 
around a consideration of the way descriptions are constructed from different 
resources (words, membership categories, commonplaces, interpretative repertoires, 
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etc.) and the way these descriptions are organized to perform particular actions.  
Moreover, it focused on the procedures through which versions of events and actions 
are produced as literal, credible and independent of the speaker.  That is, how they 
manage the ‘dilemma of stake’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992) that means all discourse can 
potentially be treated as motivated or interested in some way.   
Edwards (1997) is the other major work.  It too considered the role of 
descriptions.  However, its particular focus was on the way descriptions of mental life 
(categories, emotions, and so on) in all their different forms become parts of 
particular practices.  For example, Edwards noted that when describing actions there 
are a range of different options.  One form of description presents them as tied to the 
speaker and her or his dispositions.  Yet another common form of description 
presents actions as standard or regular.  Both are often highly indirect.   Edwards 
called such descriptions ‘script formulations’ (1994, 1997).  A key feature of such 
descriptions is that they manage accountability (or ‘attribution’ in the traditional 
social psychological language).  Presenting an action as scripted presents it as not 
requiring an explanation making reference to the speaker; however, if an action is 
presented as deviating from script in some way this can be produced as dispositional, 
and therefore to be explained by reference to the actor.  Moreover, Edwards argues 
that cognitive psychology approaches that look for mental scripts (as frames for 
information processing) can easily miss the performative nature of the script talk 
that appears in research materials.  
It is notable that as DP developed out of a rather broader discourse analytic 
approach there has been much less of an emphasis on the analysis of qualitative 
interviews.  Although such work can still be pertinent and address important issues 
(Edwards, 2003; Lawes, 1999; Wetherell & Edley, 1999), its limitations have been 
increasingly apparent (Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  At the same time, if records of 
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natural interaction can be analysed so effectively, the reasons for using a research 
procedure which embodies a range of troubles become less telling. 
The Disciplinary Context of Discursive Psychology 
It is worth briefly distinguishing DP from approaches which it shares some 
similarities and differences with.  In particular, we will consider sociolinguistics, 
social psychology of language and conversation analysis (henceforth CA).  Let us 
start with sociolinguistics and the social psychology of language.  One simple way of 
separating these approaches is to consider the different ways that they conceptualize 
language.  In much sociolinguistics language appears as a dependent variable, some 
feature of language such as lexical choice or accent is associated with a variable of 
interest such as gender, social groups, status, class or something similar.  Social 
psychology also often treats features of language as dependent variables.  For 
example, work in the ‘communication accommodation’ tradition has studied the way 
speaker’s accents modify according to the group membership of the addressee, 
modelling this according to a social psychological process model (see chapter 11).  
Work in both traditions often assumes a telemental view of language, in which it 
provides a medium for transferring thoughts from one mind to another (Harris, 
1988), and such work often assumes that words are associated with mentally 
encoded categories or concepts.   
Discursive psychology does not start out by rejecting such views (although 
there are pertinent philosophical and sociological critiques – Wittgenstein, 1953; 
Coulter, 2005).  Rather, it brackets issues of cognitive process and reference off, so 
that it can start somewhere different.  Its focus is squarely on language use – hence 
the discursive psychology rather than psychology of language or something similar.  
In particular, its focus is on discourse practices that are involved in psychological 
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orientations and constructions, or draw on psychological terms.  It is important to 
note, however, that DP provides a sideways respecification and reworking of the 
whole domain of the psychological, which simultaneously expands it and shrinks it, 
and questions the very idea that there is a clearly bounded class of psychological 
terms.  For extended overviews of the difference between DP and sociolinguistics 
Potter & Edwards (2001a); and for DP and social psychology of language see 
Edwards & Potter (1993), Potter & Edwards (2001b) – and the debate between 
Schmid & Fiedler (1999) and Edwards & Potter (1999). 
DP’s relation to CA is a complex one.  CA currently offers the most developed 
and sophisticated approach available to what would traditionally have been called 
linguistic performance.  DP draws heavily on both the analytic tradition of CA and its 
specific findings.  Sacks’ (1992) foundational work on CA also offers a sophisticated 
approach to psychological explanations and language (see Potter & te Molder, 2005 
for overview).  However, there are at two significant areas where there is a difference 
in emphasis and even potential tension.   
First, DP has built a systematic approach to relating the construction of 
descriptions to the actions that they are involved in.  For example, it has studied the 
way constructions of emotions such as anger in relationship counselling can be part 
of assigning problems to individuals, nominating them as the party requiring change 
(Edwards, 1995, 1997).  Note that such constructions are mutually inferential – 
people construct versions of their own thoughts, memories, feelings and so on as part 
of establishing versions of events or settings and vice versa.  This constructionist 
theme is much less central in CA compared to DP.  Moreover, DP draws on the 
rhetorical tradition of Billig (1996).  This highlights the way descriptions are 
assembled in ways that counter actual or potential alternatives versions.  DP is 
distinctive from other constructionist traditions in its focus on the business of 
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constructing versions in talk and texts, and its emphasis on the way constructions are 
parts of situated practices.   
Second, DP is a systematically non-cognitive approach.  That is, it brackets off 
questions about the existence (or not) of cognitive entities and processes whether 
they are part of one of the range of technical perspectives that make up modern 
psychology, or are part of the lay ontologies of mind that embedded in particular 
cultures.  Its focus is squarely on cognitive entities as they are constructed in and for 
public, interactional practices.   Note that this includes studying the way practices 
such as therapy or parenting may draw upon basic cognitivist or psychological 
distinctions, such as between surface and depth, or between public and private.  For 
the most part, CA too has been a non-cognitivist enterprise.  However, CA 
researchers have a more ambivalent approach to cognition, sometimes attempting to 
connect interactional phenomena to what they understand as cognitive phenomena 
(for an overview of these issues see papers in te Molder & Potter, 2005, and the 
debate between Coulter, 1999, and Potter & Edwards, 2003).   
So far we have overviewed general features of DP.  We now want to go on and 
illustrate its operation through specific analyses of particular topics. 
Discursive Psychology and Child Protection 
We will base our discussion on a programme of work conducted with the UK 
NSPCC (National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children).  We will focus in 
particular on studies that can be used to show the contrasting treatment offered to 
classic psychological concepts: cognition (knowledge, attitude), perception, and 
emotion.  The aim in each case will be to show how a very different understanding is 
provided by starting with how these things arise in discourse as practical issues to be 
addressed by participants.  Note that we have deliberately selected notions such as 
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emotion and perception that are often treated as prior to, and separate from, what 
would traditionally be understood as linguistic phenomena.  These are ‘hard cases’ 
for an approach that focuses on talk and text.   
The NSPCC is the major child protection charity in the UK.  Central to their 
work is a 24 hour National Child Protection Helpline that receives several hundred 
thousand calls each year.  This is legally required to pass credible reports of abuse to 
either social services or the police, whether the caller wishes it or not.  The helpline 
also provides free counselling, information and advice to anyone concerned about a 
child at risk of ill treatment or abuse, or to children themselves who may be at risk.  
It is staffed by trained social workers with at least 3 years field experience of working 
in child protection; they work under the title Child Protection Officer (henceforth 
CPO).   
Our research is based mainly at the NSPCC’s London centre.  Calls are highly 
varied.  They come from adults, young people, grandparents, parents and 
neighbours, from people of different social class and ethnic backgrounds from all 
over Britain.  They can be asking for advice, reporting abuse, requiring counselling.  
Issues are varied in severity.  They average something over 15 minutes although some 
last for as long as an hour.  Where serious abuse is suspected the CPO will follow the 
call directly with a call to the relevant police force, or, more often, Social Services. 
Calls were recorded on minidisk and then digitized for transcription and 
analysis.  All participants to the study consented to their calls being recorded for 
research and training purposes.  CPOs only recorded the call if they were satisfied 
that informed consent had been given.  The calls were transcribed initially by a 
transcription service.  These transcripts were refined using the transcription system 
developed by Gail Jefferson (Jefferson, 2004) for particular research studies by the 
second author.  Analysis worked with the combination of digitised recording and 
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transcript.  The corpus is continually developing but contained more than 250 calls 
at the time of writing.  For more details on methodological, applied or political 
aspects of the project see Hepburn (2004, in press), Hepburn & Potter (2003).  We 
will describe further relevant details as we go along. 
Cognition: Knowledge and attitude  
Psychologists are often interested in what people know, and what their 
attitudes are to things.  And they have developed a range of more or less 
sophisticated procedures for testing knowledge and assessing attitudes.  For 
discursive psychologists, in contrast, the starting place is not what people do or do 
not know and what attitudes they do or do not have, but how knowledge and attitude 
figure in interaction in particular settings.   That is, what kind of things are these for 
the participants and how are they relevant, or not, to some activities.  We will clarify 
these issues by describing a study of the opening activities in a corpus of the calls 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2003).  Let us emphasise that we have not started with these 
psychological notions, rather we have started with an attempt to explicate what is 
going on in the interaction. 
For this analysis we worked initially with a corpus of 40 call openings.  These 
were refined from the full collection because they included the core NSPCC practice 
of reporting abuse.  We eliminated calls asking for counselling, offering to donate 
money, and passing information between different NSPCC sites and focused only on 
callers ringing about suspected abuse to a 3rd party.   
There is a lot of complexity in the early actions performed in calls; we will 
focus on an element we have called a C-construction.  C-constructions often involve 
what might loosely be called ‘expressions of concern’ (hence C-construction).  Let us 
start with an example to help make sense of what they are doing and how they relate 
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to these questions of knowledge and attitude.  The following extract comes from the 
start of a call reporting abuse – the C-constructions are arrowed.  The ethics 
exchange has been removed to save space.  The transcription conventions are 
described in an appendix. 
Extract 1 LB neighbour concern 
  ((phone rings)) 1 
CPO:   Hello NSPCC Helpline can I help you:? 2 
Caller: Good after[ noon    >I   won]der if y’  3 
CPO:       [((clears throat))] 4 
  could< .hhh 5 
CPO:  [ Ye:s   certainly:, ] 6 
Caller: [I’m concerned about-]     ←1 7 
(0.2)  8 
CPO:  Yeh, 9 
(0.2) 10 
.h 11 
Caller: about a child that lives next 12 
door to me. 13 
CPO:  Tk.h ri::ght, could- before you go on 14 
((ethics exchange)) 15 
CPO:  ↑O↓kay: fine yeh go on:, sorry to stop you, 16 
Caller: Yeah I’m- I’m concerned about °h° (0.2)  ←2 17 
my next door neighbours an they got a  18 
little girl about six. an she’s 19 
always cry:in’, 20 
(0.2) 21 
.Hh 22 
CPO:  R[i:ght,] 23 
Caller:  [I  can] hear them through the wa:ll now 24 
an mum’s shoutin at ‘er like anything. 25 
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(0.7) 26 
Tk ‘I don’t want to see you get away from 27 
me:,’ an (0.3) °.hh° an I mean it’s  28 
really loud.=huh 29 
(0.3) 30 
CPO:  Ri::ght. 31 
Caller:  I mean I didn’ ‘ave a too brilliant  32 
upbringin so I w’d know what it’s li:ke 33 
so. Hh 34 
(0.4) 35 
CPO:  Ye- ri:ght yeah:=an this: is: something  36 
that you’ve >been worried about for a<  37 
whi:le [have you?] 38 
Caller:        [It  has  ] yes I’ve got a ↑friend  39 
who works in child protection and she’s 40 
told me to ri- if I’m worried, ring in. 41 
 42 
We will start with a number of observations about this extract.  
First note that at line 14 the CPS says ‘before you go on’, thereby treating the 
caller as having more to say and being about to go on to say it.  This directly follows 
the first C-construction and so treats it as incomplete.  The CPO’s ‘sorry to stop you’ 
(line 16) treats the caller as having been stopped from something.  Second, note the 
CPO’s ‘right’ on 14 and again on line 23.  Of particular interest for us is what these 
turns are not doing.  They are not assessments of the prior turn, nor are they moves 
to new business.  They are simply acknowledgement tokens (Schegloff, 1982).  Taken 
together, these things show that the CPO is treating the C-construction as the start of 
something rather than something that is complete. 
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The third point to note is that after the intrusion of the ethics exchange the 
caller resumes with a further C-construction.  This suggests that the C-construction is 
structurally important for the early activities of the call.  After the intrusion the 
activities are restarted with the C-construction.  The fourth point to note is that the 
caller continues after the CPO’s acknowledgement token (line 23) with a range of 
descriptions that suggest violence and abuse, and attend to his knowledge of events 
and motive for calling.   
Let us try and specify more precisely what are C-constructions doing, and 
therefore why they are important for the unfolding of the call.   
1. C-constructions are prefacing moves. 
As we have noted, C-constructions are hearably incomplete.  They are treated 
by both caller and CPO as elements of talk that project a possibly extended set of 
turns.  The CPO’s acknowledgement tokens treat these turns as, at least potentially, 
appropriate to the institutionally relevant issues.  
2. C-constructions project collaborative unpacking of the abuse description. 
C-constructions project collaborative unpacking by not starting with a 
definitive claim about the status of the abuse.  Instead, they operate by invoking a 
concern (or similar ‘psychological’ item), which can be worked up as more (or less) 
definitive in the course of conversation with the CPO.  The caller starts with a stance 
that is open with respect to what actions the NSPCC will respond with. 
3. C-constructions display the caller’s (appropriate) stance.  
C-constructions display the callers ‘attitude’ toward the object of the call, 
typically some kind of abuse.   The topic is treated as serious, potentially damaging or 
upsetting.  Conversely, and relevantly here, this object is not treated as something 
that the caller feels good about, are entertained by, or get pleasure or sexual 
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excitement from.  The C-construction is the caller’s first opportunity to establish 
appropriate motivations for making the call.   
4. C-constructions manage knowledge asymmetry. 
Constructions orient to, and manage, a basic asymmetry.  The caller is treated 
by both parties as knowing about the particular events and actions that they are 
calling about.  The CPO is treated by both parties as knowing about the procedures of 
child protection work, the policies of the NSPCC, what reports should be acted on.  
This is similar to the situation in medical consultations where patients are treated as 
knowing about their particular symptoms and doctors are treated as knowing about 
medicine (Gill, 1998).  The C-construction is a terrific way of managing the potential 
difficulties that the asymmetry throws up.  In projecting the unpacking of concerns 
the caller allows the child protection status of the report to be decided by the CPO.  
In doing acknowledgement tokens (e.g. line 31) and follow up questions (e.g. lines 
36-8). 
In terms of attitude and knowledge we can see how both of these things 
appear as participants’ issues and constructions.  Attitude is displayed with a C-
construction, and it is embedded as a practical part of the interaction.  It is locally 
relevant rather than something that the speaker necessarily carries around as a fully 
formed mental object.  Its production is fitted to the task at hand, of reporting abuse.  
Likewise with knowledge, differences are a practical issue to be managed in the 
interaction, and the C-construction is one effective way of doing this.  Again, we 
should not confuse the local construction of, and management of, knowledge with 
the idea that these participants have particular cognitive states or entities in any 
simple way.  Attitude and knowledge are important, but right here, right now, for the 
specifics of the interaction. 
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Note also that the C-construction itself has an interesting mind/reality tension 
built in.  They simultaneously invoke mental or psychological states, and also the 
states of affairs in the world that generate those states.  In effect, they wire in the 
basic mutual inference feature that is part of DP’s topic.  Although the word ‘concern’ 
is an item that does this job very effectively, in our analysis we found a range of other 
psychological objects that could be used instead.  For example, the word ‘worried’ 
could be used to do this job, as could an idiom such as ‘I’m going out of my bleedin 
head’ or ‘gut feeling’ (see Potter, 2005).   
We can see in this example the way psychological matters are bound up with 
the practical and institutional business of the helpline.  We need to understand 
attitude and knowledge as matters of participant concern that are produced and 
attended to for their local relevance.  Likewise C-constructions such as ‘I’m a bit 
concerned’ and ‘it’s a gut feeling’ have a subtle institutional job of managing the 
caller’s appropriate stance and the speakers’ knowledge asymmetries, as well as 
projecting collaborative unfolding of the report. 
Perception: Noise and Hearing 
A central feature of cognitive psychology is that the person is seen to be 
receiving information through the perceptual system, and this information is then 
processed.  Perception is seen as something fundamental, often bound up with 
physiology and mechanical processes.  Although there has been a tradition of social 
perception for many years this has typically been conceptualized in terms of ‘higher 
level’ cognitive processes acting on perceptual ‘input’ when other people or social 
groups are the ‘stimulus material’ (Zebrowitz, 1990).   
Recently there has been rather different tradition of work that that has 
considered ‘perception’ as a feature of situated practices.  For example, Goodwin and 
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Goodwin have studied situations where airline workers, say, or oceanographers ‘see’ 
particular planes or features of the ocean floor (Goodwin, 1995; Goodwin & Goodwin, 
1996).  Goodwin suggests that ‘seeing’ involves a range of criteria, and is oriented to 
particular local practices.  Picking up from this alternative tradition, Stokoe and 
Hepburn (2005) worked with a corpus of the NSPCC materials that included 
references to noise.  Rather like Goodwin’s studies of seeing, the aim was to study 
hearing.  In this case, however, the topic was not professional hearers (audiometrists, 
say, or musicians) but the constructions of sounds in the reporting of abuse. 
Let us illustrate this with an example.  The extract below starts immediately 
after the caller has been taken through the ethics exchange.   
Extract 3:  AD neighbour worried 
1  CPO:  So how can I help yo(h)u ◦hheh◦= 
2  Caller: =Well I’m- (0.6) hhh (0.6) I’ve  
3   just moved into a new hou:se.=  
4   oo a[bout (.) th]ree months ago. 
5  CPO:          [ M ↓m ::,  ] 
6   (0.4) 
7  Caller: .Hh and they’re: (0.3) terraced 
8   houses. 
9   (0.2) 
10  Caller: With quite thin wall:s. Hh 
11    (0.3) 
12  CPO:  R:ight. 
13  Caller: And you can hear a lot through the  
14   wa:lls: an: what I ↑seem to be  
15   hearing quite* a lot of is children 
16   screaming and crying. 
17  CPO:   R[i : : g h t. ]  
18  Caller:  [the neighbour]s.  
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19   (0.2) 
20  CPO:  Ri [ : : g h t.  ] 
21  Caller:    [An I’m gettin] a bit c(h)onc(h)erned. 
22   (0.4) 
23  CPO:  R[i: g h t.]   
24  Caller:  [I dowanna] make a big dea:l out of 
25   it but I’ve just- (0.2) >ye know I’m 
26   sittin ‘ere in the livin r’m< (.) .hh 
27   an I’ve just hear:d* ‘please don’t do: 
28   that. please don’t do: that. dad. dad.’ 
29   (0.3) 
30  Caller: ◦.Hh◦ 
31  CPO:  R:i:gh[t.] 
Let us offer a number of observations about this extract and how the various noise 
constructions are operating. 
By describing her house as ‘terraced’ and having ‘thin walls’ (lines 7 and 10) 
the caller starts to manage both the epistemic status of her reports and her identity 
as a listener.  She then spells out the implications with ‘you can hear a lot through the 
walls’ (lines 13-4).  Note here the way this is constructed: ‘you can hear’, not ‘I can 
hear’, ‘I am able to hear’, ‘if I am really quiet I can pick up…’.  The construction 
presents the hearing in scripted terms (see above, and Edwards, 1997).  This presents 
it as an anybody hearing.  Put another way, it heads off the idea that she spends time 
carefully trying to listen to what is going on; she is not a busybody. 
The first specific noise construction is done cautiously: 
what I ↑seem to be hearing quite* a lot of is children screaming  
and crying. 
The ‘seem to be hearing’ displays the caller as not rushing to conclusions and allows 
any confirmation of NSPCC relevance to be arrived at collaboratively.  The 
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construction ‘screaming and crying’ is also interesting, as in other data sets examined 
the construction ‘crying and screaming’ was much more common (see Stokoe & 
Hepburn, 2005).  It is possible that more common ‘crying and screaming’ would 
make available the inference that what is heard is a problem child.  However, 
‘screaming’ followed by ‘crying’ makes available the inference that they have been 
first frightened or hurt and then responding to this event with tears.   
The second noise construction also attends to the passivity of the hearing.  The 
caller is not trying hard to hear what is going on next door, as a ‘nosey neighbour’ 
might.  Rather she is ‘sitting here in my living room’ (lines 25-6).  She constructs 
herself as doing what an ordinary person would do.  Note the importance that this is 
treated as having for the narrative, because the caller breaks off what would probably 
have been ‘just heard’ (line 25) and inserts the living room description.  In the actual 
noise description the caller reports direct speech: ‘please don’t do: that. please don’t 
do: that. dad. dad.’ (lines 27-8).  This does a number of things.  First, reporting 
speech like this as if verbatim (we have no record, of course), manages the objectivity 
of the caller.  They are not going beyond what they have heard.  The rather flat ‘as if 
read out’ delivery further contributes to this sense of being objective.  Second, the 
words present a puzzle.  What would make a child say those particular words?  One 
solution to the puzzle is that the father is doing something abusive to the child.  By 
offering the puzzle rather than the conclusion the caller further bolsters her status as 
a reliable witness, and allows the upshot to be a collaborative production with the 
CPO.  
In their study Stokoe and Hepburn (2005) bring out an important further 
level of detail in the noise reporting by comparative analysis with set of calls to a 
neighbour mediation service.   There too, there are a large number of calls reporting 
noise from neighbours and children.  However, calls to the mediation service 
 20
typically construct what they can hear as noise, as well as being inappropriate (e.g. 
over loud or very late at night).  Such reports are systematically different from the 
NSPCC abuse reports.  In the NSPCC calls the callers do not complaining – they are 
concerned (note the C-construction in line 21) about the child, not bothered for their 
own comfort.  Their motives are produced, in the detail of the noise reporting, as 
altruistic rather than selfish. 
What we see in this study is the way aspects of perception – sound, things that 
are heard, are constructed in specific ways as parts of the discrete conversational 
practices.  There are subtle but systematic differences when calling a child protection 
helpline and calling a neighbour mediation line.  These reflect the hearing of 
‘unwarranted disturbance’ or ‘indications of child abuse’.   In this setting hearing is 
public and interactional.  This shows how ‘perception’, whatever its biological 
underpinning, is inextricably bound up with practices of interaction.   
Emotion: Crying and Empathy 
Emotion is a theoretically interesting topic for discursive research as it too is 
something of a ‘hard case’.  That is, it is often treated as something close to biology, 
something lying underneath language and maybe even culture.  Often in social 
psychology emotion is treated as a causal variable that exerts a distorting effect on 
cognition (Park & Banaji, 2000).  However, Edwards (1997) has suggested that the 
very category ‘emotion’ needs to be treated cautiously.  The boundaries and contrasts 
of what makes up ‘emotion’ are different across cultures and settings.  Indeed the 
category ‘emotion’ itself is a feature of a particular modern and Western idea of the 
person.  As Edwards (1999) suggests: 
Emotions are not only contrasted with cognitions (whether rational or not), 
both in ‘folk’ and in professional psychology, but there are also cognitive 
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theories of emotions, and indeed cognitive models that virtually do away with, 
or explain away, emotion categories altogether. But there are also emotion-
based explanations of cognition, of what people think, what they think about, 
and why they think one thing rather than another (because of envy, jealousy, 
prejudice, obsession, etc.). 
Edwards has used ideas from conversation analysis, cultural anthropology and 
constructionism, as the basis for a respecification that focuses research on: (a) the 
use of ‘emotion’ categories; (b) orientations to objects and actions as ‘emotional’ and 
(c) displays of ‘emotion’.  Some of these features appear in a further development of 
our child protection project where callers’ crying and CPO’s responses to crying are 
the topic of analysis (Hepburn, 2004). 
One of the features of psychological work on crying is that it has 
overwhelmingly worked with participants’ reports of crying (in questionnaires or 
rating scales).  There is no work that uses direct observation, or attempts to provide 
situated descriptions of crying.  This meant that one of the early research tasks was to 
develop an extension to the Jeffersonian transcription scheme that would represent 
different features of crying such as sobs, whispers, wet sniffs and wobbly voice (see 
appendix for details).  This fine grained description of crying provides a way of seeing 
how the different activities in crying and crying recipiency are organized together.  
We can illustrate this with the following extract.  Various characteristic elements of 
crying on the helpline are highlighted such as caller apologies (A), and CPO actions 
such as ‘right-thing’ descriptions (RT), ‘take-your-times’ (TYT) and what we have 
termed ‘empathic receipts’ (ER). 
Extract 4: JK distraught dad 
Caller: >.Hhih .hhihhh< 1 
CPO: D’you want- d’y’wann’ave [a break for a ] moment.= ←TYT 2 
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Caller:           [ Hhuhh >.hihh<] 3 
=>hhuhh hhuhh< 4 
(0.6) 5 
Caller: .shih 6 
(0.3) 7 
Caller: ◦◦k(hh)ay◦◦ 8 
(1.8) 9 
Caller: .shih >hhuh hhuh[h]< 10 
CPO:       [S]’very har:d when    ←ER 11 
they’re not there with you isn’t it.=    ←ER 12 
and [you’re-] (.) you’re tal:kin about it.   ←ER 13 
Caller:     [>.hhih<] 14 
(0.8) 15 
Caller: >.Hhuh .HHuh< 16 
(2.1) 17 
Caller: .shih  18 
(0.2) 19 
Caller: ◦.shih◦ (.) ◦◦(Need) hhelp(h)◦◦ 20 
(2.5) 21 
Caller: .HHhihh◦hh◦ 22 
(0.5) 23 
Caller: HHhuhh >.hih .hih< 24 
(0.7) 25 
CPO: .Htk.hh Well you’re doing what you can now to  ←RT 26 
actually offer them protection and help though  ←RT 27 
are:n’t you.        ←RT 28 
Caller: .Skuh (.) Huhhhh  29 
(0.5) 30 
Caller: ◦◦I:’m not the(hehheh)re. Hh◦◦ 31 
(3.2) 32 
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Caller: .Shih 33 
(0.4) 34 
Caller: ~↑I’m ↑sorry.~       ←A 35 
CPO: An they als- well E-E-Eddie obviously al- thought ←RT 36 
you were the person to contact to get he:lp.   ←RT 37 
Caller: Yeh. hh 38 
CPO: F’which (.) ye know he turned to you: .hh   ←RT 39 
(0.7) 40 
Caller: .Hh[h°hhh°     ] 41 
CPO:    [T’help ‘im.]=didn’t he.      ←RT 42 
Caller: ◦◦Yhhehhh◦◦ 43 
CPO: So ‘e saw you as a person who could help in this ←RT 44 
situa[tion ] for him:.       ←RT 45 
Caller:       [.Shih] 46 
(0.9) 47 
Caller: .Hdihhhh hhhuhh  48 
(0.2) 49 
Caller: H↑oh: s(h)orry.       ←A 50 
(0.4) 51 
CPO: .Htk s’↑oka:y. kay. 52 
(1.3) 53 
Caller: .SKUH 54 
(0.3) 55 
CPO: It’s distressing but it’s also quite a shock  ←ER 56 
isn’t it I guess [(for you)]      ←ER 57 
Caller:        [.HHHHhih]hh  HHHhuhhhh 58 
(1.7) 59 
Caller: ((swallows)) °Hhhoh dhear.° 60 
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Once we have a description that allows this level of detail to be revealed we can start 
to observe a range of interesting features about the way the extract develops.  First, 
note the way the take-your-time in line 2 is occasioned by the caller’s sobbing that 
starts in line 1 and continues through to line 4.  We can see how delicate the mutual 
attention in this interaction is as, despite the sobbing, the caller responds to the take-
your-time with a whispered ‘khhay’ (line 8).    
Second, note further on in the sequence the caller’s wobbly voiced apology 
(line 35).  We might think that the caller is apologising for the transgressive nature of 
sobbing with a stranger or something similar.  However, a careful examination of 
where apologies appear in crying sequences suggests that they are more likely to be 
apologies for disruption of ongoing actions or failing to provide normatively expected 
contributions.  That is, they are explicated better by understanding conversational 
organization.  For example, in this case the CPO’s assessment in 26-8 is followed by 
an extremely quiet and very disrupted second assessment on 31 (the normatively 
expected turn).  The following delay from the CPO would allow the turn to be 
recycled, and the apology could be specifically apologising for the absence of this 
recycling.   
Third, note the right-thing descriptions on 26-8 and through 36-45.  These are 
constructed from information already provided by the caller, redescribed to present 
him having done the right thing.   Such descriptions seem designed to reassure the 
caller and move him out of crying.  These descriptions are often accompanied by tag 
questions (e.g. 28 and 42), which may be designed to move the caller out of crying by 
encouraging agreement with the right-thing description.   
Finally let us consider the interesting topic of empathy.  Recently some 
researchers have started to develop an interactional account of empathy (Pudlinski, 
2005; Ruusuvuori, in press).  We have marked segments of this extract where the 
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CPO does ‘empathic receipts’.  The category empathy comes from psychology rather 
than interaction analysis; however, there are a cluster of features that tend to go 
together in empathic receipts.  Typically there is a formulation of the experience from 
the recipient’s point of view or of the recipient’s ‘mental state’.  Thus on line 11 there 
is the formulation it’s ‘very hard’ and on line 56 the formulation ‘it’s distressing but 
it’s also quite a shock’.   Interactional contributions such as this are potentially tricky 
as the speaker is offering a version of something that the recipient is normally 
expected to know best.  Features such as the tag questions (12 and 57) and displays of 
epistemic caution (e.g. ‘I guess’ on 57) may be a way of managing this.   
More generally, although emotion is often thought of as something that is 
beyond the purchase of DP, studies of this kind show the way that issues and actions 
which we understand as emotional can be tractable to interaction analysis.  This is 
not surprising once we remind ourselves of the practical and communicative role that 
emotions play in social life (Planalp, 1999).  DP offers the possibility of 
understanding the various phenomena loosely glossed as emotion in terms of what 
they are doing and where they appear in peoples’ lives. 
Discourse, psychology and interaction 
 Work in contemporary DP is made up a number of closely related themes.  
These NSPCC studies illustrate a number of them:   
? They are studies of the procedures through which the psychological 
implications of talk are managed.   
? They consider the practical use of the mental thesaurus (terms such as 
‘concern’, ‘hearing’, ‘screaming’), although it simultaneously makes 
problematic a simple distinction between a mental thesaurus and other terms.   
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? They are studies that respecify core theoretical notions from orthodox 
cognitive and social cognitive psychology (knowledge, attitudes, perception, 
emotions).   
? They focus on the ‘embodiment’ of psychological states in displays, for 
example in the sobs and sniffs of crying.   
? They address the relationship of psychological and institutional issues, 
exploring the way the business of the helpline (reporting abuse, orienting to 
expertise, and so on) is actively accomplished, in part by the use of 
psychological terms and practices. 
There is another theme of DP research that is focused specifically on psychological 
research methods in practices.  It studies both the interactional accomplishment of 
the method and the constitution of particular findings.  There has not been space to 
overview this work here (but see Antaki, 2005; Puchta & Potter, 2002; and, from a 
more specifically CA perspective, Schegloff, 1999).  
In addition to these research themes there is a developing interesting in the 
potential for DP doing practical or applied work.  For a discussion of the problems 
and possibilities here see Hepburn (2005) as well as a range of the contributions to 
Hepburn & Wiggins (forthcoming). 
In general then, discursive psychology offers a way of theorizing and analyzing 
psychology as a feature of people’s practices.  It starts with records of what people 
actually do.  In the examples discussed here we have focused on interaction on a 
helpline, but DP work has been done in a wide range of different settings, and the 
research is limited only by the imagination of the researcher and the possibility of 
gaining appropriate access.  It offers a picture of psychology that is embedded in 
practices rather than abstracted from those practices.   
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Appendix – Transcription notation 
The transcription notation is most fully described in Jefferson (2004).  
Hepburn (2004) has developed symbols specifically for dealing with features of 
crying. 
 
General transcription notion 
[   ] Square brackets mark the start and end of overlapping speech.    
↑ ↓  Vertical arrows precede marked pitch movement, over and above normal 
rhythms of speech.  They are for marked, hearably significant shifts.  The aim 
is to capture interactionally significant features, hearable as such to an 
ordinary listener. 
→ Side arrows are not transcription features, but draw analytic attention to 
particular lines of text.   
Underlining signals vocal emphasis; the extent of underlining within individual words 
locates emphasis, but also indicates how heavy it is. 
CAPITALS mark speech that is obviously louder than surrounding. 
°↑I know it,° ‘degree’ signs enclose obviously quieter speech (i.e., hearably produced-as 
quieter, not just someone distant). 
that’s r*ight. Asterisks precede a ‘squeaky’ vocal delivery. 
 (0.4) Numbers in round brackets measure pauses in seconds (in this case, 4 
tenths of a second). 
(.) A micropause, hearable but too short to easily measure. 
((text)) Additional comments from the transcriber, e.g. context or intonation. 
she wa::nted Colons show degrees of elongation of the prior sound; the more colons, the 
more elongation.   
hhh Aspiration (out-breaths); proportionally as for colons. 
.hhh Inspiration (in-breaths); proportionally as for colons. 
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Yeh, ‘Continuation’ marker, speaker has not finished; marked by fall-rise or weak 
rising intonation, as when enunciating lists.  
y’know? Question marks signal stronger, ‘questioning’ intonation, irrespective of 
grammar. 
Yeh. Periods (full stops) mark falling, stopping intonation (‘final contour’), 
irrespective of grammar. 
bu-u- hyphens mark a cut-off of the preceding sound. 
>he said< ‘greater than’ and ‘lesser than’ signs enclose speeded-up talk.  
solid.= ‘Equals’ signs mark the immediate ‘latching’ of successive talk, whether of  
=We had  one or more speakers, with no interval.   
heh heh Voiced laughter.  Can have other symbols added, such as underlinings, pitch 
movement, extra aspiration, etc. 
sto(h)p i(h)t Laughter within speech is signalled by h’s in round brackets. 
Features of crying 
°°help°° Whispering – enclosed by double degree signs 
.shih Wet sniff   
.skuh Snorty sniff 
~grandson~ Wobbly voice – enclosed by tildes  
↑↑Sorry High pitch – represented by one or more upward arrows 
k(hh)ay Aspiration in speech – an ‘h’ represents aspiration: 
hhhelp in parenthesis indicates a sharper more plosive sound 
outside parenthesis indicates a softer more breathy sound 
Huhh .hhih Sobbing – combinations of ‘hhs’, some with full stops before them to indicate 
Hhuyuhh  inhaled rather than exhaled, many have voiced vowels, some have voiced 
>hhuh< consonants.  If sharply inhaled or exhaled – enclosed in the ‘greater than/less 
than’ symbols (> <)  
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